17 February 1959

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

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	Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004300220001-9	
	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	
	17 February 1959	
	DAILY BRIEF	
	I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	25X1
	USSR:	
	25X1 Soviet Marshal Malinovsky said that the USSR intends to retain a modern conventional armed force while	
	simultaneously improving its nuclear capability. Malinovsky L said he believed NATO was in error for having favored nuclear	 25X1
25%	capability at the expense of conventional forces. He admitted the possibility of limited warfare, a departure from Moscow's	
	usual propaganda position.	25
	i	
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	Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004300220001	-9			
øk. **1	India-Pakistan: New Delhi and Karachi apparently are adopting more conciliatory attitudes toward each other. His level Pakistani and Indian officials will meet in Karachi on 23 February to attempt to settle some minor territorial disputes. Both capitals have expressed cautious optimism over prospects for agreement on the division of irrigation water derived from the major rivers which flow through both India and Pakistan. At present, Pakistan is pressing less hard than before for consideration of the Kashmir issue.	gh- s- 25X1 er			
	Australia-Indonesia: The joint communiqué issued on				
OK.	y es not Iew se h e ch .s- 25X1				
Ethiopia-UK: Ethiopia's relations with the UK appear to have deteriorated sharply over London's recently expressed nonopposition to an eventual association between Somalia and the British Somaliland Protectorate. Radio Moscow, echoing Ethiopia's controlled press, accuses London of plottingwith American supportto establish a Commonwealth-affiliated					
	17 Feb 59 DAILY BRIEF ii				
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		III. THE	WEST		
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. 0 10	more than a holess they can re	ding operation fo	or the Christian nt on the future	Democrats. Un- political course	25X1
25X1	called.	ol Cogtrola aggur	nation of the an	ima miniatan	
	ship on 16 Febras delayed gov		ate the duality ons and actions.		
sk	trips and whole ing. Certain of ably receive in	heartedly assum his pet projects creased attention minican <u>Republi</u>	e the responsib s, such as land a. Cuban plottin	ilities of govern- reform, will prob- ng against the re- Paraguay, and Haiti	25 X
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the USSR intends to retain a modern conventional capability while building up its nuclear strength The defense minister implied that some military leaders had favored preparing a nuclear capability at the expense of conventional forces, but that the government Presidium had decided in favor of simultaneous development, which he personally approved. NATO, Malinovsky noted, had adopted the other course and he considered this an error.
Significant improvement of the ground forces in the past several years bears out Malinovsky's statement. Probably related to this decision is Malinovsky's comment that limited wars, including a limited nuclear war, were quite possible and would require a large army trained with nuclear weapons. Soviet propaganda, however, consistently has played down the possibility of limited warfare, while Soviet military literature has indicated that the USSR sees future warfare in the form of large-scale campaigns on land extending over a long period, accompanied by powerful nuclear air and missile strikes.
weapons would be decisive in a general war but that other arms and weapons would continue to play a major rolea line both he and former Defense Minister Zhukov have expounded.

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India and Pakistan Adopt Conciliatory Attitudes

Since the assumption of power by Pakistani President Ayub last October, both his government and the government of India apparently have made efforts to improve relations between the two countries. Ayub and his foreign minister have both expressed a desire for better relations, and Ayub broke recent custom by attending the independence day celebration at the Indian High Commission in Karachi last January. Nehru has several times publicly stated the need for moderation and understanding between India and Pakistan.

Top-level Indian and Pakistani officials will meet in Karachi on 23 February to continue the effort begun last year to settle minor territorial disputes along the Punjab and Bengal borders. A similar meeting in 1958 on East Pakistan frontier problems led to a conference in September between Nehru and Firoz Khan Noon, head of the Pakistani Government at that time. While the agreement they reached has been criticized in India and has not entirely ended recurrent border shooting incidents, it apparently is regarded by both governments as final.

Directives to cease inflammatory propaganda, recently is-


sued by New Delhi and Karachi to radio stations in border areas, indicate a willingness to settle border problems. Pakistan is sending a trade delegation to New Delhi, which should also facilitate such an agreement.	d- 25X1
While great obstacles still stand in the way of an over-all Indepakistani settlement, the deliberate friendly gestures being made suggest that both countries now hope agreement on minor question will pave the way for eventual negotiations on such major problem as Kashmir. Official quarters in both capitals have expressed	S 25Y1
cautious optimism over the possibility of agreement on the canal waters issue as a result of current mediation by the World Bank.	
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Ethiopia's Relations With London Deteriorating

Ethiopian-British relations, long marked by suspicion and mistrust on the Ethiopian side, have been subjected to serious new strains as a result of London's recent policy statement indicating that Britain would not oppose an eventual association between the Italian trust territory of Somalia--scheduled to become independent in December 1960--and Britain's Somaliland protectorate. Ethiopian officials, sensing a threat to Ethiopia's traditional desire for hegemony over the East African Horn, reacted by accusing London of plotting--with American support--to establish a Greater Somalia affiliated with the British Commonwealth. Actually, London's statement was intended to undercut both Somali nationalism and UAR propaganda in the area and did not constitute support for the full union of the 2,500,000 ethnic Somalis now distributed in Somalia, British and French Somaliland, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

Ethiopian Foreign Minister Deressa has emphasized his country's concern over the British position by indicating to the American ambassador in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia might abrogate its 1954 border agreement with the UK, close British consulates, and seal Ethiopia's border with the protectorate. Although the Ethiopians probably will not carry out these threats, they are apparently searching for and may take some type of anti-British action.)

In line with the Ethiopians' desire to appear as vigilant defenders of African interests who are unafraid to oppose the will even of great powers, the controlled press and radio of Addis Ababa has given unusually great publicity to the issue, directing unprecedented attacks against the United States as well as Britain. Its diatribes are already being exploited in Moscow radiobroadcasts.

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III. THE WEST

Fidel Castro's Appointment as Cuban Prime Minister

Fidel Castro's acceptance of the office of prime minister in Cuba's provisional government will eliminate the duality of power which has hindered the functioning of the Urrutia administration. Although Castro will undoubtedly continue to dominate the government, his assumption of a high post does not necessarily indicate he will wholeheartedly accept the responsibilities of office. His performance since the ouster of Batista on 1 January suggests he is more interested in retaining his own popularity than in attending to the affairs of government. With emerging signs of discontent over the administration's failure to act decisively on economic and social problems, Castro may be tempted to continue his speech-making trips at home and possibly abroad. However, certain projects of particular interest to Castro, such as land and labor reform, will probably receive his attention.

There is no indication of a letup in the "campaign against dictatorships," although activities against the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have apparently not yet progressed much beyond the planning stage. Plotting will undoubtedly continue, and members of the Castro movement will probably offer material aid to exile groups. The propaganda campaign continues unabated. The Cuban representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) announced on 16 February that Cuba would withdraw from the OAS unless representatives of "dictatorships" are expelled.

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